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  Throughout much of nineteenth century, seafarers sailing the waters off Malaya often experienced vio-
lence, as the era witnessed shifts in wealth and power.  Although new technology and colonialism are asso-
ciated with the pacification of the region in Southeast Asia’s historiography, Asian seafarers in the region 
employed such forces for their own economic and political gain.  Some Asians used institutions created 
supposedly to reinforce European power to conduct piracy, while others exerted influence on colonial 
structures to act within their interests by attacking their enemies and protecting their assets at sea !
In the twilight of the golden age of Malay piracy, a 
court of law convicted five suspected pirates of capital 
murder in a case sensationalized by the Singaporean 
press.  As they departed the courthouse for jail under 
heavy guard, a diverse crowd of people gazed upon 
them with great scrutiny.  The court had convicted the 
pirates of attacking a tongkang, or a boat, and butcher-
ing the crew without mercy.  One man had survived the 
fierce attack despite sustaining various injuries, losing 
his hands to the attacker’s blade. The pirates had 
thrown the deceased crew overboard and left the hand-
less man to die.  Miraculously, he was saved from cer-
tain death by the crew of a steam launch under the 
command of Pilot Davies.   
The murders so disgusted the pirates’ fellow villagers 
that they handed them over to the colonial police to be 
tried in court.  Such brutality had become unusual by 
the time of the trial in 1884, but this was hardly the case 
for much of that century.   This particular instance 1
represented the end of an era dominated by maritime 
violence in the seas of Malaya as piracy became unac-
ceptable to most seafaring communities there.  The 
villages used the colonial justice system to dispose of 
the pirates using state-sanctioned violence so peaceful 
traders no longer needed to fear those pirates.   
The seafaring communities along the coasts and 
rivers of Malaya have long depended on the sea for a 
critical means of communication and trade with the 
rest of the world.  Maritime violence thrived during the 
nineteenth century as people of various backgrounds 
took to the seas in search of plunder, threatening the 
livelihoods of other seafaring communities.  Malayan 
society, with its weak political centers during the mid-
nineteenth century, provided opportunities for pirates  2
to attack vessels vulnerable at sea.  They attacked ves-
sels throughout the waterways off Malaya with little 
likelihood of punishment by the authorities.   Although 
scholars often associate colonialism and new technolo-
gy with piracy’s decline, these forces also strengthened 
pirates’ effectiveness.  This study will show that partic-
ular seafaring communities in or near major British 
colonial ports of the Straits Settlements exploited the 
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changes caused by colonialism to achieve greater suc-
cess in their use of maritime violence from the period 
1825 to 1885.   
The geographic and chronological parameters of this 
investigation include waterways that became increas-
ingly important to European powers and traders during 
the period of 1825 to 1885.  The Straits of Malacca were 
a critical waterway in the Malay World with extensive 
trade flowing between the Malay Peninsula and Suma-
tra.  Another important waterway was the South China 
Sea of which the southwesterly part formed the shores 
of eastern Malaya.  In Malaya, the British East India 
Company expanded first to Pulau Pinang or Penang in 
1786 and later to Singapore in 1819, which placed the 
company in competition with Dutch interests in the 
region.  The East India Company governed territory 
like a state but ultimately answered to the British gov-
ernment.  This study examines maritime violence close 
to the shores of the states of Johor, Pahang, Tereng-
ganu, and Kelantan.  The timeframe of this investiga-
tion commences after the consolidation of British au-
thority over Singapore when no particular power con-
trolled commerce in the aforementioned waterways. 
Although piracy in the waters off Malaya never ended, 
the year 1885 represents a time when piracy had already 
significantly declined.  This work will focus particularly 
on instances of maritime violence related to the 
seaborne trades and vessels of the British Straits Set-
tlements of Penang, Malacca, and Singapore from 1825 
to 1885.    
This study will examine how Southeast Asian seafar-
ers employed aspects of colonialism and Western 
technology for their own gain mainly through anecdo-
tal evidence.  Tacit agreements allowed particular 
Malay leaders to conduct piratical raids on commerce, 
while the colonial governments protected them for 
political and strategic reasons.  Singapore’s high vol-
ume of trade attracted merchants from throughout the 
region, which in turn lured pirates who threatened the 
government’s legitimacy.  The development of a new 
passport system gave opportunities to local seafarers to 
gain wealth and prestige.  Technology from the West 
enhanced local seafarers’ abilities to act in their own 
interests that occasionally included attacking colonial 
assets.  Overall, Southeast Asian seafarers were able to 
take advantage of colonial institutions not only to de-
feat their enemies but also to raise their status in soci-
ety.  The next section will examine the relationship 
between colonial authorities and local rulers in matters 
of maritime commerce and piracy.   
Colonial Governments, Commerce, 
and Response to Piracy 
Malay rulers, supposedly under the influence of 
British and Dutch colonial authorities at Singapore and 
Rhio-Lingga respectively, ignored piracy and in some 
cases, even participated in it.  British officials ques-
tioned the promise by the Sultan of Lingga, a Dutch 
client, in 1831 to suppress piracy because a multitude of 
vessels sailed to Lingga with pirate booty and fitted out 
there for further expeditions.  Witnesses alleged that 
the sultan’s perahu, or sailing vessel, carrying his 
brother-in-law to Terengganu attacked a sampan-
pukat or boat.   British authorities wrote to the Dutch 3
resident of Rhio, contemporary Riau, about the possi-
bility that the Sultan of Lingga had ordered unpro-
voked attacks on vessels despite his pledge to cease 
such activity.  The resident accepted the possibility that 
the sultan and the populations of the archipelagos of 
Rhio and Lingga engaged in such attacks, but that such 
allegations lacked sufficient proof of their 
involvement.   Submitting to a colonial overlord thus 4
meant protection from other powers in the region even 
if these local rulers disobeyed colonial policies regard-
ing piracy during the early nineteenth century because 
of the weakness of European rule.   
Malay leaders, including the temenggong in the 
British sphere of influence, also used the cosmopolitan 
port of Singapore as a base for their own piratical ex-
peditions according to Dutch authorities.  In response 
to the allegation that the Sultan of Lingga participated 
in piracy despite his promise to the contrary in 1831, 
the Dutch resident retorted that pirates hid in Singa-
pore.  The resident stated with certainty that the 
temenggong, residing at Telok Blangkah on the island 
of Singapore, engaged in piracy and ordered his as-
sociates in the Singapore harbor to gather intelligence 
for him on perahu departure times.  His men attacked 
the particularly valuable vessels using gunpowder and 
shot purchased in Singapore.  Having stolen the vari-
ous cargoes, he sold the goods below market prices for 
funds to acquire more stores and to continue plunder-
ing the waterways of the region.  The resident argued 
that piracy was more common near Singapore than his 
territory because the former enjoyed higher trade vol-
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umes.  He noted much of the islands’ populace partici-
pated in piracy, which made its extermination quite 
challenging.   Both the Dutch and British authorities 5
knew of the complicity of their allies’ involvement in 
piracy, but kept the relationships cordial for political 
reasons.  Local rulers benefitted from piracy by allow-
ing trade with them while acknowledging to the Euro-
peans the evils of piracy as instructed.  Piratical seafar-
ers benefitted from the port of Singapore as it provided 
them with a unique concentration of weaponry and 
vulnerable prey relatively unprotected by local authori-
ties.   
A raja of Johor amassed a sizeable fleet and had mate-
rial support from the merchants of Singapore despite 
the British government stance against the raja plunder-
ing vessels.  Jadee, a mariner and warrior under a raja 
of Johor operating from a secret base near Cape Ro-
mania, recalled nostalgically from his time with the 
raja, “We were all then very rich-ah! such [sic] num-
bers of beautiful wives, and such feasting! but [sic], 
above all, we had a great many most holy men in our 
force!”   The fleet of thirteen perahu bought weapons 6
and supplies in Singapore, likely including brass can-
nons, and then attacked Chinese and Bugis vessels 
sailing throughout the archipelago.   Plunderers of 7
vessels at sea had a mutually beneficially relationship 
with the arms merchants who benefitted from the vio-
lence.  Singapore profited from the sale of materials 
employed in attacks on shipping in the region despite 
attempts by the government to suppress piracy.   
Societies such as Thian Tai Huey engaged in piracy 
near Singapore with near impunity because shipping 
converged on the port, which lacked sufficient protec-
tion for vessels outside its anchorage.  For instance, a 
big group of Thian Tai Huey members assaulted a large 
Siamese vessel that was unable to reach the anchorage 
of Singapore and therefore remained in the straits off 
Tanjong Katong.  During the night, the followers 
boarded the Siamese vessel by boat and slaughtered 
much of the crew.  The Thian Tai Huey pirates loaded 
the cargo into their boats and retreated into the interi-
or of the island with their plunder.  Only four crewmen 
survived and reported the massacre to the police who 
investigated the vessel on orders of the magistrate. 
The stricken vessel had multiple decomposing bodies 
with various hack wounds lying on deck, while the cul-
prits left much of the cargo scattered throughout the 
blood-drenched vessel.  The police brought the vessel 
to the anchorage and continued the investigation but 
failed in convicting anyone.    The pirates gained from 8
Singapore’s commerce by attacking vulnerable vessels 
attempting to enter its anchorage.  Groups such as the 
Thian Tai Huey ruthlessly exploited Singapore as a 
base for piracy to attack unsuspecting vessels in the 
vicinity. 
Although piracy devastated the Chinese merchant 
community in Malaya, governments seemed incapable 
of effectively dealing with piracy, even when merchant 
vessels operated in convoys.  In April 1833, pirates 
blockaded the harbor at the mouth of the Terengganu 
River.  The Straits Settlements government responded 
inadequately even as reports emerged that pirates 
trapped four sampan-pukat loaded in total with 
$200,000 worth of cargo.   Three of the vessels es9 -
caped unharmed but the fourth came under attack; 
pirates forced the fourth vessel into the Terengganu 
River after killing the commander and nine of the crew, 
along with wounding five more.  The local government 
fired on the pirates to keep them away from the vessel. 
In response, forty Chinese merchants on May 4 peti-
tioned the Straits Settlements governor to protect 
Asian merchants from piracy.  Piracy had been increas-
ing at an alarming rate, especially on the east coast of 
Malaya where trade valued one million Spanish dollars 
a year.  The governor ordered the schooner Zephyr to 
investigate the seas, but the pirates disappeared.   The 10
merchants hoped to take advantage of the British colo-
nial presence for the protection of their trading vessels 
through a naval campaign against the pirates.  The 
failure to prevent pirates from capturing valuable car-
goes threatened the legitimacy of the colonial state 
because it failed to protect its inhabitants and their 
property.  The Chinese merchants of Singapore need-
ed the British authorities to clear the seas of pirates, 
while the Britons needed the Chinese to make Singa-
pore prosperous.  The occurrence of piracy on the 
Malayan east coast was so prevalent that even Chinese 
convoys were vulnerable to pirate attack.   
Singapore’s Bugis community also requested help 
from the Straits Settlements government in defeating 
the pirates so that it could trade with less risk.  The 
chief of the Bugis kampong or village in Singapore 
complained in 1831 to the government about the twen-
ty-two piratical perahu lurking not far outside the har-
bor at Pulau Tinggi.  Most of these vessels were dou-
ble-banked with oars that carried one hundred or more 
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men onboard.  The pirates inhibited trade between 
Singapore and much of Southeast Asia with their at-
tacks on seven trading vessels that sailed from as far 
away as Bali.  Losses included the vessels, gold dust, 
diamonds, tin, and sarongs.  Although three of the 
crews survived by swimming ashore once attacked, 
others perished or became slaves.  The kampong chief 
criticized the British anti-piracy efforts as being inferi-
or to the Dutch and threatened to leave Singapore for 
elsewhere if the government failed to act effectively.  11
Many merchants resided in particular ports because of 
their economic potential, such as the Bugis in Singa-
pore, but losses from piracy became so bad that it 
threatened the economic viability of Singapore.  If the 
situation failed to improve, Bugis merchants had the 
option of moving to Dutch territory, where the gov-
ernment was more vigorous in hunting down pirates. 
The issue of maritime violence posed such a great 
threat to various communities within Singapore de-
pendent on maritime trade for survival that it pressed 
the government to place more effort in destroying pira-
cy.   One such method colonial authorities developed 
in response to piracy was a new passport system. 
Development of a Colonial and 
Sultanate Passport System 
The British colonial state in the Straits Settlements 
commenced the distribution of passports to all trading 
vessels departing from its territories as a means to bet-
ter detect and stop piracy in 1836.  By this time, piracy 
plagued the Straits of Malacca with the disappearance 
of untold souls, cargoes, and vessels, with pirates from 
the old Johor kingdom proving the most troublesome 
in the area to British authorities.   British authorities 12
and Malay rulers overseeing ports in the Straits of 
Malacca region thus established a pass system for mar-
itime traders.  This entailed paperwork that included 
information on the destination of the vessel, the type 
and quantity of cargo, and a description of the arms 
onboard.  Nakhoda, or masters of Malay vessels, re-
ceived such passes and presented them upon inspec-
tion by marine patrols.  Various states along the Straits 
of Malacca, including that of the Straits Settlements of 
Penang, Malacca, and Singapore, required that all trad-
ing vessels departing the port obtain and carry passes. 
Failure in presenting a proper pass to the authorities or 
other suspicious activities justified the detention of the 
vessel.   The Straits Settlements enacted the passport 13
system as a means for tracing the legal ownership of 
cargoes, making pirates more vulnerable to naval pa-
trols, which ultimately benefitted local seafarers and 
Malay sultanates.  The passport system helped prevent 
piracy and apprehended suspected pirates by allowing 
for easier identification without excessively trampling 
on the rights of merchant vessels or extracting large 
fees from them in the Straits of Malacca and other wa-
terways. 
The new passports protected honest ship owners and 
their seafarers from accusations of piracy and saved the 
state time from unnecessarily determining the origin of 
cargoes.  Passport systems gave an advantage to peace-
ful traders who had little to hide from British colonial 
authorities because the passes, in theory, prevented 
authorities from accusing merchants and crews of pira-
cy without sufficient evidence.  The rationale for the 
passport system concluded that if seafarers could not 
provide the correct passes, these seafarers had only 
themselves to blame for the detention of their vessel 
and cargo while authorit ies conducted an 
investigation.   The colonial authorities required that 14
vessels, owned by Chinese, Malays, and other groups, 
to carry authentic passports and documents.  Passport 
systems, although hardly new to the Straits of Malacca, 
permitted European and Malay governments in the 
region to better track maritime trade and investigate 
incidents of piracy rather than extort traders for their 
cargoes as the Portuguese had done in the 1500s.  The 
passport system allowed government officials to detain 
vessels that were potentially engaged in illicit activity 
and saved officials’ precious time by providing an effi-
cient means of narrowing in on suspicious traders.   
The colonial and local governments employed a 
combination of military force and civil administration, 
including the development of a passport system, to 
protect local seafarers from piracy during the nine-
teenth century because strategies based solely on 
killing or capturing pirates proved ineffective.  In 1836, 
Captain Henry Ducie Chads of HMS Andromache 
joined the counter-piracy campaign in the Straits of 
Malacca in coordination with the local government.  15
Later that year and shortly after Captain Chads’ cam-
paign against the pirates, the Straits Settlements gov-
ernment initiated its passport program.   The success16 -
es of military action alone proved temporary as pirates 
simply returned to their old bases when European mili-
tary presence decreased.   Local governments re17 -
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quired policies aside from military force for the preven-
tion of piracy in part because the British government 
decided against permanently stationing a significant 
naval force in the Straits of Malacca.  The deployment 
of a Royal Navy warship suggests the failure of colonial 
governments to protect shipping and coastal villages 
from piracy.  Subduing pirates in the Straits of Malacca 
in the short term permitted colonial authorities to es-
tablish long-term institutional measures to prevent 
further occurrences of piracy and protect seafarers 
from their attacks.   
The British and Indian colonial governments’ pass-
port system hence developed in the wake of an anti-
piracy campaign as a follow-up policy to suppress pira-
cy in the waterways of Malaya without incurring too 
high of a cost at a merchant’s expense.  Although the 
Indian government commissioners considered the 
issuance of passes unnecessary, Governor-General 
George Eden, the head of India’s Supreme Govern-
ment and Baron of Auckland,  insisted on the devel18 -
opment of a pass system at the discretion of the Straits 
Settlements government.  Importantly, the order gave 
colonial authorities the right to search vessels on the 
high seas for evidence of piracy.  The governor-general 
also permitted the Malay authorities and Dutch author-
ities at Rhio to examine the passes to stop piracy.  The 
Dutch governor-general in Batavia and various other 
Malay rulers approved similar measures.   The British 19
Indian government persuaded various states and 
colonies in Maritime Southeast Asia to adopt the pass-
port system with relative ease.  Aside from making the 
task of identifying pirates easier for colonial officials, 
the passport system, when various states in the region 
cooperated, protected the rights and property of sea-
faring merchants.   
The creation of an effective passport system fre-
quently required international cooperation.  One par-
ticular incident highlighting this necessity concerned 
the Sultan of Terengganu and a Chinese junk that sup-
posedly carried a British colonial passport.  The inci-
dent exposed the need to gain international coopera-
tion for the creation of an effective passport system. 
Governor H. J. Butterworth of the Straits Settlements 
wrote to Sultan Omar of Terengganu concerning the 
sultan’s dispensing of justice toward twelve seafarers 
with a passport from Singapore.  The sultan’s men 
arrested the twelve seafarers on suspicion of piracy and 
brought their sinking junk into the harbor.  The local 
government released them to the Chinese community 
in Terengganu who claimed to know them, while it 
inquired with Singapore about the vessel and her crew. 
According to Butterworth, “…people came from Ling-
ga to Trengganu [sic] who said that they were wounded 
and (their houses) burnt by the pirates of a junk and 
asserted that the 12 men who were under guarantee 
were the people who wounded them…because of a 
mark on his [one of the Chinese sailors] arm.”  Sultan 
Omar executed all twelve Chinese seafarers on the 
accusations of the Lingga islanders to the displeasure 
of Gov. Butterworth and likely the Chinese merchant 
community.   The implementation of the passport 20
system thus required the cooperation of foreign pow-
ers including the Dutch East Indies, Malay sultanates, 
and seafarers of various national backgrounds because 
the passports were mere pieces of paper without for-
eign governments respecting their authority.  The 
rather hasty executions of British passport carriers 
showed one reason why the British colonial authorities 
wanted more influence over the Malay sultanates such 
as Terengganu.   
Merchants in the region found advantages to operat-
ing from colonial Singapore because they received 
additional protection from the British government and, 
to an extent, from the relative unfairness of the Malay 
sultanates’ judiciary through the passport system. 
Butterworth’s letter to Sultan Omar criticized him by 
stating “…these passports are indeed respected by all 
those who know our customs.”  The governor suggest-
ed that the Chinese resisted the sultan’s patrols be-
cause they feared that the Terengganu patrol vessels 
were pirates.  He claimed that Chinese from Hainan, 
the place of origin of the twelve crewmen, were not 
known for piracy.  Butterworth encouraged continued 
cooperation between the colonial and Terengganu 
governments.   The passport system offered merchant 21
vessels a degree of legal protection from state naval 
patrols in the region.  The sultanate likely executed 
subsequent crews convicted of piracy only after the 
local government waited for Singapore’s response to 
passport inquiries, which benefitted those suspected of 
piracy.  If masters of vessels received passports, they 
essentially took advantage of the British colonial sys-
tem by seeking its protection from the arbitrariness of 
Malay governments’ executions.   
The differences between the judiciary of Terengganu 
and Singapore resulted in the latter needing to exert its 
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authority over the former to protect the interests and 
lives of merchants and seafarers.  Governor Butter-
worth acknowledged to the sultan the existence of in-
valid passports, “…these passports are sometimes ob-
tained from false sources…” and that the twelve Chi-
nese seafarers executed for piracy likely carried false 
paperwork.   Butterworth criticized the executions 22
because the sultan did not check with the British Resi-
dent Councilor Thomas Charles in Singapore whose 
duty was to investigate the validity of passports.  Had 
the sultan’s government completed a thorough investi-
gation, the colonial government would not have com-
plained about the issue.   The inadequate judicial re23 -
view in Terengganu disturbed the colonial government 
of Singapore because of the vulnerability of local mer-
chants’ lives and property in its waters.  The seemingly 
arbitrary execution of passport-wielding merchants 
required the colonial government to interfere with 
Malay legal systems.  Whether by design or circum-
stance, the passport system, once enforced, gave the 
Straits Settlements a fair amount of political power 
over the various Malay states along the Straits of 
Malacca.  The system incorporated the British legal 
system into these states, because colonial officials 
found their legal systems lacking.  The passport system 
gave the British Straits Settlements reason to interfere 
with the judicial process in Terengganu and prevent 
unfair executions of British subjects.   
The Terengganu Sultanate lost portions of their sov-
ereignty during the implementation of the passport 
system but continued with the system because its rulers 
suffered from pirate attacks.  Cooperation with Euro-
pean authorities allowed a degree of protection of their 
wealth.  During June and July of 1851, the Sultan of 
Terengganu dispatched his war perahu on counter-
piracy patrols to protect merchant vessels from pirate 
attacks, which eventually led to the sultan’s confisca-
tion of the aforementioned junk and the arrest of the 
twelve crewmen.   Furthermore, the sultans of 24
Terengganu suffered the loss of their own trading ves-
sels.  In 1832, around thirty or forty piratical perahu 
attacked the sultan’s vessel of eighty tons burthen car-
rying a valuable cargo of coffee, pepper, and tin near 
Pulau Tinggi while en route to Singapore.  The pirates 
slaughtered the crew and took the prize to Kemaman 
on the eastern side of the Malay Peninsula.   The Sul25 -
tan of Terengganu found British governance of the 
Straits Settlements potentially advantageous as the 
colonial officials returned the sultan’s lost vessel when 
his government provided the necessary paperwork 
proving his ownership in 1835.   The strength of colo26 -
nial and European navies yielded benefits to Malay 
rulers when they cooperated with authorities in Singa-
pore.  The sultan found working within the passport 
system advantageous, as did other Malay rulers, be-
cause it provided an avenue for the return of their lost 
vessels and the protection of trade.   
Simultaneously, the Straits Settlements employed 
Southeast Asian seafarers for naval patrols and protect-
ed them from external legal actions.  In the Supreme 
Court of the Straits Settlements, a merchant named 
Lim Bee sued Jadee, the Malay commander of a British 
gunboat named Emerald, who had confiscated the 
former’s boat and cargo during a counter-piracy patrol. 
Jadee had detained Lim Bee’s vessel because he had an 
expired passport from another merchant.  Sir William 
Norris, the Straits Recorder, made a judgment for the 
lawsuit regarding the vessel and its cargo in 1842.  27
Mr. Garling, the Resident Councilor and Chief Execu-
tive Authority of Penang, testified for the defense to 
maintain that Jadee had acted lawfully.  The Sultanate 
of Perak, where Jadee had detained Lim Bee’s vessel, 
had agreed to the adoption of the passport system a 
year earlier in 1841.  Lim Bee departed Kurow, Perak 
while illegally carrying opium to Penang, some of 
which he attempted to throw overboard but which the 
crew recovered.  The gunboat crew sent him to Mr. 
Ferrier, the local magistrate for his detention and even-
tual prosecution.    28
With the backing of the colonial government, Jadee 
brushed off the legal challenge to his prize, or a cap-
tured vessel and cargo, earned lawfully as a naval patrol 
leader and hence benefitted from the British passport 
system by enforcing British law near Penang.  The 
recorder decreed that Jadee had sufficient cause for 
detaining the vessel and ruled in his favor with expens-
es to be paid by the plaintiff.   The only caveat was that 
the government had to return the seized arms to the 
plaintiff, but Jadee and his crew kept their prize.  29
Norris ruled that Jadee acted according to the orders of 
the Indian government that instructed “the Comman-
ders of the Gun Boat forming part of the Marine Estab-
lishment… to examine the passes of Native boats and to 
detain them in cases of suspicion.”    30
Southeast Asian seafarers were important agents of 
the state during the early nineteenth century as they 
" 	 EXPLORATIONS a graduate student journal of southeast asian studies37                                  
Scott C. Abel
filled critical roles necessary for the success of the 
colonies.  The incentive of plunder lured experienced 
seafarers to the ranks of colonial establishment.  Jadee 
used his position as a gunboat commander and the pass 
system to his advantage by confiscating the cargo 
whenever he apprehended smugglers. The colonial 
state, in turn, sanctioned the seizure because it needed 
people such as Jadee to enforce its authority.  Addi-
tionally, the colonial state needed other advantages 
over local seafarers but a shortage of resources forced 
the government to rely on new technologies to increase 
its authority.  In the next section, the study examines 
how colonial governments used such technology for 
their own gain and how local seafarers employed this 
same technology for the advancement of their interests.   
Technology and Colonialism in British 
Malaya 
Western technology played a vital role in strengthen-
ing the colonial mission in Malaya, but local seafarers 
also employed Western technology to their advantage. 
Steamboats played an important role in advancing 
British colonialism, but local seafarers also employed 
one for a piratical purpose in at least one incident.  At 
the same time, Western firearms were so pervasive that 
colonial authorities had great difficulty in preventing 
local seafarers from obtaining them.  Even fixed struc-
tures built to establish colonial authority such as light-
houses and police stations were exploitable by local 
seafarers.   
Steam-powered vessels played an important role in 
nineteenth-century empires as Europeans made them 
available in East Asia where they not only defied the 
winds and currents, but also challenged established 
political structures.  Technology played a vital role in 
the formation of the British Empire and the projection 
of its power overseas by using technologically sophisti-
cated gunboats and other vessels powered by steam. 
Few technological innovations were more potent for 
the spread of European empire during the nineteenth 
century than the development of the steamboat.   The 31
use of gunboats in Burma during the First Anglo-
Burmese War between 1824 and 1826, along with the 
deployment of steam gunboats during the Opium War 
were critical because of their transport, communica-
tion, and combat abilities.   However, steamboats 32
possessed no will of their own and there was no inher-
ent reason why Asians could not use them to their own 
advantage when acquired from their manufacturers 
through colonial ports.     
In Malaya, one instance of an attack on a British po-
lice station revealed that local Chinese employed 
Western technology for their interests at the expense 
of the colonial authorities.  Police stations maintained 
colonial law and order and therefore overrunning one 
armed with Western technology signified a serious 
challenge to British authority.  According to a colonial 
report from the magistrate of Klang in Selangor, Chi-
nese pirates from Pinang armed with revolvers and 
rifles assaulted “the police station at Kota Shah at the 
mouth of the Perak River… on Sunday morning the 11th 
at 2 am” with “$1500 taken together with one chest of 
opium valued at $900.”   The Chinese gang’s 33
planned attack on the police station showed the usage 
of modern technology for their gain and to the deter-
ment of the British imperial rulers.  The police sta-
tion’s vulnerability to attack also showed the limits of 
British expansion in Malaya as the maintenance of au-
thority relied on isolated posts with little chance of 
reinforcement in the event of a sudden assault.  Certain 
inhabitants of Malaya exploited such weaknesses by 
employing available Western technology.  The report 
showed how the colonial bureaucracy maintained order 
in colonial territory by using information regarding 
imperial assets and communications technology to 
learn about those who opposed British authority.   The 
colonial bureaucracy responded more effectively be-
cause it was able to collect and distribute knowledge 
concerning their adversaries to the relevant people. 
The Klang magistrate wrote about the material losses 
and pertinent details about the attackers such as their 
ethnicity, weaponry, and likely means of transporta-
tion.  He assessed the attack on the police station by 
the amount of property stolen.  Local Chinese em-
ployed Western technology acquired from a colonial 
territory to raid a British police station, which showed 
to colonial officials the vulnerability of colonial posts in 
Malaya to assault. 
In response to the attack on the police station, colo-
nial authorities alerted officials along the straits to the 
possible presence of a piratical steamer.  Colonel A. J. 
Perks’ letter to the resident wrote, “I sent the Abdul 
Samad [government steamboat] with Inspector Cross 
onboard to Kuala Selangor yesterday afternoon to give 
timely warning there….” It also requested the light-
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house keep at Klang to watch for those responsible for 
the “very daring piece of piracy.”   The government 34
wanted to protect the coast against further depreda-
tions and apprehend the culprits by quickly alerting its 
agents in other states.  The extent of British authority 
in Malaya often relied on the rapid delivery of intelli-
gence about threats to its power, property, and people 
through magistrates and other officials separated by 
long distances with steamboats that quickly steamed 
from station to station.   
The Indian government prevented the Straits Settle-
ments government from sustaining firearm restrictions 
for commercial reasons, which allowed Southeast 
Asians to acquire Western weaponry.  The accessibility 
of firearms allowed for groups, such as the group that 
attacked the police station in Kota Shah, to fight not 
only colonial authorities, but also local enemies 
throughout Malaya.  Firearms become increasingly 
available in parts of Southeast Asia, especially in the 
major colonial ports such as Singapore, which discour-
aged the restriction of their distribution because of 
their importance to the local economy.  During a 
Straits Settlements president’s meeting in Singapore 
on 2 March 1830, the Straits Settlements government 
had initially “resolved that- no person shall be allowed 
to manufacture gun powder or line arms without a spe-
cific license” in Singapore. Furthermore, a license 
would be available only if the manufacturer could pro-
vide security for the facilities.   The export of firearms 35
became illegal without the consent and a written expla-
nation from the police.   However, the Indian gov36 -
ernment overruled the colony, because regulation 
seemed futile as French and American merchants sold 
firearms in the region.  Malay pirates at the time more 
commonly used brass cannons over muskets as well.  37
It became politically difficult for the Straits Settlements 
to control the firearms trade because of the demand for 
weapons and related materials.  A robust British arms 
trade proved as important to the supreme government 
as piracy suppression, because of its economic signifi-
cance.  In this way, arms became more easily available 
to seafarers in Southeast Asia.    
Despite the economic incentive, colonial govern-
ments in Maritime Southeast Asia tried to clamp down 
on firearms in a concerted manner for fear of violence. 
By the mid-nineteenth century, both men and women 
in Malaya of various ethnicities became proficient in 
the use of firearms from America and Europe.  Singa-
pore attempted a ban on arms exports in 1863 but it 
lasted only a short while because of the importance of 
the arms trade to the region and to Singapore itself.  In 
1873, the Dutch East Indies persuaded Governor Sir 
Harry Ord to ban the export of arms to North Sumatra, 
which significantly damaged the arms trade in Singa-
pore.  The ban on exports, designed to assist the Dutch 
colonial government embroiled in the Dutch-Aceh 
War by clamping down on the arms trade in Aceh, last-
ed until 1900 when the Dutch colonial state was finally 
strong enough to deal with unrest.   The ease of acces38 -
sibility to European and American weapons showed 
that Southeast Asians had the potential to employ In-
dustrial-Era technology for their own interests even if 
such interests ran counter to that of the colonial au-
thorities.  The colonial governments of the Dutch East 
Indies and British Malaya thus recognized the necessity 
of restricting firearms for the sake of political stability.   
At the same time, Southeast Asians did not necessari-
ly need to own or operate Western technology them-
selves in order to use them for their own end.  Instead, 
they were able to petition colonial and Malay authori-
ties to employ such technology to eliminate their ene-
mies and recover property.  Al Mushrifah wal 
Mukazamah wrote, “Chinese pirates have already 
started robbing [boats] sooner than last year… and... 
the English and all the Malay kings [will] try their very 
best to drown those Chinese pirates because they have 
caused a lot of doom and destruction …” to trade. 
Mushrifah continued, “If the steamship Hooghly can 
be sent there at this time [for] this matter [of piracy 
suppression], [we] would then go ask Mr. Governor to 
go inspect the boat[s] [at sea] in case they already en-
tered our friend’s state.”  He continued, “…if the [pi-
rates’] boats are no longer present in Terengganu….” 
Mushrifah and his associates planned to obtain passes 
for trade.   Malays in Singapore by the mid-century 39
became more reliant on colonial authorities with their 
highly sophisticated technology.  Malay sultanates also 
worked to reduce or eliminate pirate threats to ship-
ping.   The cooperation of the Malay and British au-
thorities in the campaign against piracy benefitted 
many locals by securing waterways for trade by mer-
chants who eventually needed less security than during 
the heyday of Malay piracy. 
Lighthouses and other maritime infrastructure, often 
with benign appearances, strengthened the power of 
the colonial and provided economic benefits to seafar-
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ers.  Eric Tagliacozzo argued that lighthouses, buoys, 
and beacons played an important role in state devel-
opment during the second half of the nineteenth centu-
ry for British and Dutch colonies in Southeast Asia. 
They were important for an overall colonial strategy 
that employed maritime technology to improve their 
control over Insular Southeast Asia.   He argued that 40
lighthouses provided the colonial states of the Dutch 
East Indies and British Malaya with observation points 
that lit up the archipelago and served as symbols of 
colonial authority.   Lighthouses provided for colonial 41
development in regions difficult for the colonial capi-
tals of Singapore and Batavia to control.   Maritime 42
infrastructure provided a degree of security by allowing 
seafarers and the state to see potential threats such a 
pirates and environmental hazards. 
Malaya’s British colonial authorities embraced mar-
itime infrastructure, such as lighthouses, as instru-
ments of political power during the 19th century.  The 
colonial response to the raid on the Kota Shah police 
station included a letter that stated, “I [A. J. Perks] 
have also sent to Klang lighthouse and instructed the 
light-keeper to send me word at once if he sees a 
strange steam launch hanging about the coast[.]”  43
Insular Southeast Asia posed challenges to seafarers 
navigating its critical waterways through natural ob-
structions such as shoals and rocks, but also people 
who plundered vessels sailing the waterways.  The 
seemingly benign lighthouses along the shores of 
Malaya were the eyes of the state and important places 
for gathering information.   
The isolation of maritime infrastructure in Malaya 
forced British colonial officials to focus on protecting 
these often-exposed assets from assault by pirates.  For 
instance, during the early 1870s, Selangor, in western 
Malaya, was a hotbed of piracy especially around the 
mouths of the Jugra and Langkat rivers.  Rumors 
abounded that the sultan’s son, Raja Yaacob, was a 
pirate leader.  The local geography well-suited pirates 
as the rivers, jungle, and marsh provided mazes for 
escaping colonial authorities.  Against this backdrop, 
pirates, allegedly from Langkat, assaulted the Cape 
Rachado Lighthouse on 11 January 1874 at around 8:30 
p.m.  The offenders almost certainly planned the attack 
because the eleventh was the day when the lighthouse 
keeper and his assistant received their monthly pay. 
The attack struck fear into the crew of the boat that 
supplied a local lightship, who refused to victual the 
lightship on 21 January of that year.  Eventually, a larg-
er vessel with a police guard sailed with supplies for the 
lightship crew.  The inability or unwillingness of the 
Sultan of Selangor to deal with the pirates led to ru-
mors that he was too addicted to opium or too old to be 
an effective leader.  One rumor was that he even re-
ceived a cut of the plunder.   The series of the light44 -
houses became significant to the peaceful navigation of 
the Straits of Malacca.  Lighthouses, like other colonial 
structures, were often located away from colonial cen-
ters and were hence very much exposed to assault.   
Lighthouses and police stations served as beacons of 
imperial British authority in Malaya during the nine-
teenth century but were vulnerable to attack by pirates. 
As symbols of colonial authority and institutions devel-
oped for the protection of life and property, lighthous-
es and police stations were critical assets developed at 
strategic points such as river mouths and other coastal 
points for maximum effect.  Their positions along criti-
cal waterways allowed for resupply and communication 
with colonial political centers by steamboat.  However, 
the infrastructure’s locations along major waterways 
exposed them to attack.  To the local people in Malaya, 
the structures were symbols of wealth that were vulner-
able to plunder.   Locals also saw them as symbols of 
foreign occupation.  The isolation of such structures 
from reinforcements, the inability to communicate with 
other bases in an emergency, and the lack of defenses 
meant that these symbols of colonial authority were 
vulnerable to attack by pirates.  Other institutions in 
colonial Singapore, such as weapon shops, actively 
aided pirates in their goals as well. 
Straits Settlements Institutions and 
Piracy 
Although suppressing piracy became one of the main 
goals of the Straits Settlements government, the Straits 
Settlements, especially Singapore, sustained maritime 
violence by supplying pirates with weapons, naval 
stores, and knowledge.  Some merchants wanted the 
government to purge the seas of pirates to protect their 
assets and associates, but others benefitted from piracy 
through the sale of weapons to pirates.  Even Singa-
pore’s education system allowed for social advance-
ment within pirate societies.  Straits Settlements insti-
tutions helped Southeast Asians use violence in their 
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own interests even if this was contrary to the institu-
tions’ original purpose. 
Reports and survivor accounts stated that Singapore 
provided Asian pirates a port of call and a vital supply 
base for their operations along important waterways 
such as the Straits of Malacca.  According to Indian 
government reports, Straits Settlements officials knew 
that a large quantity of military stores reached pirates 
through their distribution from Singapore, Malacca, 
and Penang.  Officials concluded that pirate fleets fit-
ted out in ports such as Singapore before stalking their 
prey.  Although the Indian government granted the 
right to arrest Asian crews and to detain their vessels in 
port given the suspicion of piracy under Act XII of 1857 
to the Straits Settlements government, its governor was 
unable to gain the authority to limit the sale of military 
stores.   A nakhoda reported pirates boarded his ves45 -
sel in 1854 and stole some of the cargo. One of the pi-
rates remarked that they had bought their guns right 
next door to where merchants sold the cargo on the 
vessel.  The piracy caused the robbed Chinese vessel to 
return to Singapore and report the attack to authori-
ties.   Despite repeated attempts by the Straits Set46 -
tlements government to restrict access of firearms, 
gunpowder, and other military stores, it usually failed 
because of their importance to the local economy. 
These inabilities allowed pirates to purchase weaponry 
that they were unable to make themselves in Singa-
pore.  Such weaponry gave them an advantage in the 
various attacks on other craft in the waters of the 
Straits of Malacca and the South China Sea as Western 
weaponry outgunned any locally produced arms.   Con-
trary to the wishes of the Straits Settlements govern-
ment during the years under British Indian rule, Sin-
gapore provided pirates with powerful weaponry 
through shops that were important to its economy.  
Al Mushrifah wal Mukazamah, an inhabitant of Sin-
gapore, wanted the ability to trade peacefully with 
northern Malaya and relied on colonial institutions to 
bring about the necessary changes to protect maritime 
traders.  The Chinese pirates off the waters of Malaya 
had dealt significant blows to seafarers and owners of 
maritime assets.  Piracy’s restricting effect on com-
merce clearly concerned Mushrifah.  He desired that 
the British and Malay authorities defeat the pirates at 
sea and clear the waterways for commerce.  The writer 
also seemed aware of the political circumstances in 
Malaya at the time in both British and Malay circles, as 
he wrote, for instance, “…our Mr. Church, Resident 
Councilor who was made well susceptible at this time 
in the State of Singapore.”   Such a statement ap47 -
peared accurate with Church retiring in August 1856 
after two stints in Singapore.   The author’s awareness 48
of the political and economic situation in Malaya 
showed that he had a vested interest in the political 
stability of the peninsula and political connections with 
both Malay and British officials.   
The colonial port of Singapore was useful to pirates 
in the region for gathering intelligence and supplies 
according to reports on piracy.  According to Inspector 
Blundell, piracy by the Chinese grew to a hitherto un-
precedented level in the waters off the Malay Peninsula 
by the 1850s.  Junks employed for the sole purpose of 
piracy frequently called at Singapore not only for refit-
ting, but also to obtain intelligence on when other sail-
ing vessels departed the port.  In two reported in-
stances when Blundell suspected vessels of piracy, he 
removed the rudders of the junks to prevent their de-
parture.  However, Blundell also cited the inability of 
the government to hunt down pirates and requested a 
low-draft steamer under the command of a Straits naval 
officer.   Gaining reliable information on other vessels 49
allowed the pirates to attack without excessive search-
ing and increased their odds of success, while also di-
recting the pirates to the most profitable vessels to 
plunder.  The need for a low-draft steamer suggests 
that the government had great difficulty in catching 
small yet fast boats that easily cleared sand banks and 
entered shallow waters such as rivers that were not 
deep enough for colonial patrol craft.  Colonial ports 
conveniently gave pirates a place to gather information 
on their prey, along with obtaining the weapons for use 
in their attack.   
Opportunistic seafarers who lived in Singapore re-
sorted to piracy without permission of their investors 
or managers by attacking smaller and vulnerable craft 
along the vital waterways off Malaya.  Born in 1832 as 
the son of a general dealer who owned two Malay per-
ahu, Ah’moi committed his first act of piracy at the age 
of twelve while en route to Penang when the crew 
agreed to seize forcibly a smaller vessel.  While the rest 
of the crew labored below the deck, he noticed a 
wounded old man who appeared be hiding something 
around his waist.  Noticing nine gold bars, he snatched 
them, disposed of the man with a knife, and hid the 
gold from his father whom he feared would discover 
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that he pirated a vessel.   Regional governments thus 50
lacked the means or desire to patrol the important wa-
terways such as the Straits of Malacca for pirates effec-
tively, which allowed opportunistic crews based in 
colonial ports such as Singapore to plunder other ves-
sels if they had significant advantages in crew strength 
and weaponry.  If Ah’moi’s crew attacked a smaller 
vessel without consent from their employer in Singa-
pore, it was likely many other opportunists operating 
out of major ports also engaged in such behavior.   
People of means residing within the Straits Settle-
ments had the opportunity to obtain a colonial educa-
tion to further their own ends as well.  This education, 
in turn, aided their ability in conducting maritime vio-
lence.  At age sixteen, Ah’moi attended missionary 
school, which he continued for three and a half years 
until the school expelled him for a prolonged 
absence.   Ah’moi then joined the Taiping rebels who 51
pillaged vessels in the South China Sea.  He was able to 
gain status as an interpreter because of his knowledge 
of the English language that he had learned in Singa-
pore as a student.   The colonial education system 52
provided an English-language education in Southeast 
Asia to people who would have been unlikely to gain 
fluency otherwise.  Ah’moi, a Singapore-born Chinese 
pirate, used the colonial Christian education system 
and his command of English to distinguish himself 
from other Chinese seafarers to gain advancement 
through the ranks of his crew. 
The cosmopolitan economic system in colonial Sin-
gapore, where Chinese-speaking merchants often re-
quired English translators, provided opportunities for 
bilingual speakers such as Ah’moi to engage in illicit 
activities by exploiting global connections and his im-
portant position onboard his vessel.  Ah’moi gained a 
position as a supercargo and interpreter on a British 
barque, a sailing vessel, owned by a Chinese trading 
house in Singapore on a voyage to Shanghai, China 
with his father's influence.  He absconded with $800 
worth of cargo.  He joined Ching Ah’ling as an insur-
gent against the Qing dynasty and later became a pirate 
again.   Using, his knowledge of English and global 53
networks, Ah’moi embezzled materials at sea for his 
own gain.  Ah’moi thus used the skills he learned from 
a missionary school to act as a go-between for both 
British and Chinese societies.  This opportunity was 
made available through the British colonial mission. 
He chose to employ his skills as a pirate, which allowed 
him a degree of success because there were few places 
where Chinese people were able to study at British 
schools other than in Singapore at that time.   
Conclusion 
Local seafarers found opportunities in and around 
the Straits Settlements to prepare for and conduct vio-
lent operations at sea to extract material gain.  Colonial 
authorities protected some Malay rulers to keep them 
as local allies despite their tendencies to attack com-
merce.  Pirates operated near Singapore because of its 
commerce and even sailed into Singapore’s harbor to 
gather intelligence and supplies for future attacks. 
The passport system allowed for seafarers in the em-
ployment of the East India Company to make a living as 
naval patrols against pirates and smugglers.  Other 
locals used colonial institutions to clear their enemies 
from the seas or to gain rank through the colonial edu-
cation system.  Despite the wishes of the colonial gov-
ernment, local seafarers resorted to piracy with the 
assistance of colonial Singapore’s various institutions.   
As such, successful seafarers and merchants in 
Malaya, especially in Singapore, often harnessed colo-
nial policies and institutions for their own interests by 
using maritime violence and remaining close to the 
centers of those forces such as Singapore.  Seafarers of 
various backgrounds attempted to gain advantages 
over others through violence.  When colonial authori-
ties introduced new measures to suppress piracy, pi-
rates often found countermeasures to continue their 
lifestyle, which in turn forced colonial officials to de-
velop new measure to defeat pirates.  Ultimately, the 
forces of economic competition, industrialization, and 
British colonialism proved too strong for old Malay 
maritime states.  Although elements of the old system 
survived the colonial era, the Malay maritime kingdoms 
shattered irrevocably in part because of their inability 
to protect and earn income from maritime commerce. 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